different kinds; among them, one might want to single out the phenomenon of 'linguicide', as defined by Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas in a number of publications (most recently 1994); I will come back to these issues below, section 3.
But also in other respects, 1993 is typically an 'in befween' year. If one is interested in, and lends credence to, dates as representative of trends and happenings, here are some typical landmarks (chosen rather arbitrarily among many possible ones):
The year before this, in 1992, it was 30 years since pragmatics was born, so to say, out of the posthumous brain of John L. Austin: How to Do Things With Words appeared on the scene in 1962.
The year 1993 itself celebrates the tenth anniversary of the publication of two major treatises on pragmatics, Leech's Principles of Pragmatics and Levinson's Pragmutic.s. Both works have since come to be recognized as classics, even if they are notoriously difficult to use as texts; especially the latter is more of a comprehensive handbook than a textbook in the usual meaning of the term: a text to be used as the rrainstay of an introductr)ry course in pragmatics. (Horn, writing about Levinson in 1988 , thinks otherwise; for a different view, cf. my own (1986) review of both books).3 F-inally, next year, in 1994, we will be able to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Austin's 'second cclming', one could say, at the hands of John Searle, whose Speeclt Acts, thai other classic of pragmatics, first saw the light of day in 1969.
One of the things that happen in Drabble's 'Garrick Year' is that Emma, the heroine, finds herself in a new situation with which she has some ditficulty to cope. When I was asked, in early 1993, to deliver the plenary lecture (on which the present article is based) at that year's International Pragmatics Conference, I felt a bit like an elderly uncle who is supposed to tell the younger crowd what lit-e's all about: where we came from, where our roots are, and where we are going: typically the kind of speech you'd expect from an elder statesman (not to say a Dutch uncle) and not quite the kind of stage I normally t-eel happy on.
Let me therefore mention another Garricky happening, this one on the personal level. In 1993, I submitted a book on pragmatics to a serious publisher under a title that I thought was extremely appropriate, but that the publisher adamantly and consistently refused to place on the cover:
'Out of the waste-basket: An introduction to pragmatics' (some of my readers may have seen a pre-publication copy). The book was eventually accepted under a new title (Mey 1993) , and I suppose one could call my present production a Garrick-type stage show, something like: 'Out of the waste-basket, into the fire!', harking birck to my book's original inscription as well as to the great 3 H".e is Horn, in his own words:
"lf thc coming of agc of an academic discipline is at least partly conclitioned on the emergence of a braod, comprehensivc, intellectually honcst, and pedagogically sound introductory textbook, pragmatics is in pretty good shape. With the publication of lrvinson (1983), we have a text for pragmaties that is superior to any extant analog for its'mother discipline'semanlics, and compares favorablywith standard rexts in phonology and syntax... " (1988: 113) actor's talent of finding excruciatingly banal titles fur his own comedies"4 As we all know, titles are tricky -they may trick you into reading a book that you had no intention of reading, into doing things that you were not supposed to do, into wanting to say things that you didn't mean or want to say. As an instance, take the title of the present piece. Originally, I had ventured forth for my Kobe 'talk with an exuberant and grandiloquent 'pragmatics in the third millennium' -which was supposed to furnish the audience with a vista of pragmatics after the turn of the century. (One question that mrght have been discussed in this connection rs, of course, the vexrng problem whether there will be any pragmatics left at all at that point of trme).
Realizing that this was t'ar beyond the reaches and capacities of my little crystal ball, I decided to go for the less bold title (actually the one heading the present introductory section):
'Pragmatics in the Nineties'. This title had at least the advantage of covering a period of which roughly one third is past already, thus relieving the strain on my gazing powers by about the same tactor, since I wouldn't have to worry about predicting what had already taken place (as Austin and Searle themselves admonish us in connection with that particular speech act of 'predicting').
But even though some pressure thus was taken off the title as far as predicting the future rs concerned, part of the 'nineties is still with us in the form of the past; so are, and will be, the things happening right now and up to the magic vear 2000. Wanting to make my'nineties picture as complete as possible, I would have to base my gazings, for whatever they're worth, not only upon an analysis of what has happened so far, but also on an interpretation of what is happening right now, and on a tentative outline of the developments that I expect to take place in the coming years.
A major concern of pragmatics, in general, is how to help peoJlle become better users clf the word, nclt just users: pragmatics, in this view, does not limit itself to merely looking at the users and describe what they do, but gcles actively out (sometimes even out of its way) to discover means of helping the linguistically underprivileged. This explains the title of my piece. One major development of pragmatics, rn my opinion. will center itself around questions of linguistic survival; hence my subtitle, An earlier subtitle of my piece considered these matters under the headings of 'Topics, Tre nds, Perspectives'; since this still seems a practically useful division, I shall stick to it in what follows.
Topics
Dwight Bolinger, one of the nestors of American linguistics, once remarked that in his opinion, there had been in our century "one -perhaps only one -upsurge of popular interest in how language aff'ects our lives" (Bolinger 1980: vii) . The remark is made in the Preface to a book that Bolinger published after his wife's death; it is a labor of love. and dedicated to the dear departed one. The book is also quite unlike the other things that Bolinger had produced in the course of a long and fertile life as a linguist" In short, it is a book in the spirit (albeit not in the tradition) of pragmatics.
The'upsurge'Bolinger is referring to, is that generated by Alfred Korzybski and his so-called 'General Semantics' -a word that soon came to be a bugaboo for young linguists in the tifties like myself, who were warned explicitly against Korzybski (and against his best known follower and popularizer, the late S.I. Hayakawa, of sixties notoriety and assorted other, senatorial fame). We were told that an interest in matters such as 'language and society'. 'language and mind', 'language and people' had very little to do with science. and certainly nothing with linguistics.
As a result of all this, I never got to read Korzybski or Hayakawa, and Bolinger's book, Language tlte loaded weapon (1980) , only rather late in life -to be exact, six months after I had talked to its author on the phone for the last time, a year before his death. Only then I decided to tind out what that funny little book of his was all about. By the time I had tinished the book, and had taught a freshman class based on it as a text, Dwight Bolinger had passed away, so I never had a chance to tell him how much I liked this work, and how close I felt he was to many of the things that we, as pragrnaticists, stand for.
One may safely assume that Bolinger would not have objected to being considered a pragmaticist (h" never called himself that explicitly).s The term 'pragmatics' is not mentioned anywhere in his book. Yet, the general tenor of it is pragmatic, as witnessed by the quote above. It is also clear that Bolinger, in unraveling the threads emanating from Korzybski's work, got as far back as to Sapir and Whorfthe rest is silence. Taking into account the transatlantic gap, attested also by the lack of knowledge of Bolinger's book among most Continental Europeanso, as well as the fact that what Bcllinger published in 1980 had been written a number of years earlier (in tact, most of his examples stem from the years 1970-74), it seems safe to say that Bolinger (and probably most people on his side of the Atlantic) were unaware of a European development in the seventies that was to spur a new "upsurge of interest in the way that language atfecis our lives", a movement in linguistics that subsequently came to be known as pragmatics.
As Bolinger's case nicely shows, yclu don't have to believe in pragmatics to be a pragmatician -although it certainly helps. Not all of us are Bolingers; most of us are hidebound by our petty beliefs and predilections, and rarely lift our eyes to look across the fence that we so laboriously have erected to protect ourselves from alien int-luences and from disturbances of our small circles.
In the spirit of the celebrated M. Jourdain (from Le bourgeois-gentilltomme by 5 Jef Verschucren (pcrs. comm.) has drawn my attention to rhe fact that Bolinger actively served on thc IPrA Consultation Board from 1986 through 1990, when he had to step down because of his faihng health.
6 A f"* honorable exceplion, such as Jan-Ola Ostman and Jef Verschueren. deserve to be mcntioned; the latter actually reviewed Bolinger's book right after it came out (Verschueren 1981) .
Molidre), who came to look upon himself one day and discovered that for tbrty years, he had been speaking prose, for many of those who now regard themselves as pragmaticists, the coming of the new discipline was a welcome event. But there is a difference: while Dwight Bolinger was a true, natural pragmaticist, l4le must become worthy of that name by laboring (sometimes against the trends of our time), carving out a niche for what we think is the most important element in language studies: humans and their use of language.
But notice that what today reads like an invocation, or even worse, a platitude, was not at all commonly accepted in Bolinger's times of writing. The spirits of the 'upsurge' he is referring to: not only the Korzybskis and Hayakawas, but even more so (but naturally sarr comparaison) the Whorfs and Sapirs, were still haunting the linguistic backwoods, and woe unto him or her who ventured out there without the necessary protective gear. Many would-be pragmaticists of the early hours trying tct enter the Linguistic Garden were apt to suffer mutilation, or even untimely death, at the hands of the syntactic henchmen and the semantic gatekeepers, who prevented the non-initiated trom approaching the garden's nlore remote parts, let alone communing with the ugly things in the pragmatic woodshed.
If you allow me to indulge a little more in personal reminiscences: the first mention of anything (pragmatic' in my own writings turns up as late as 1976, in a talk I gave in Finland under the title of 'Qualification, emancipatory language and pragmatic linguistics'(notice that I didn't dare to let'pragmatic'stand alone!). In actual fact, I had already started the publication of what was to become, after a number of editorial mishaps and collapsing publishing houses, Lhe 7979 volume entitled hagmalinguistics: Theory ancl haclrce, which managed to come out in one of the fortunate, but erratic interstices when the venerable publishing house of Mouton, The Hague (who had published Chomsky's flrst book in 1957) was not either going bankrupt or being bought up by the expanding firm of Walter de Gruyter, Berlin. Incidentally, if I may continue my reminiscing, that volume was itself an offspring from an earlier paper I had given at the XIth Congress of Linguists in Bologna in 7912 -however,, that paper's title doesn't mention the word 'pragmatic' at all, but uses the safer, less oftensive, less programmatic term 'practical': 'Some practical aspects of a theory of perfirrmance' (M.y 1974; notice how the title, judiciously and studiously, covers the author's linguistic tracks by appealing to the then-current official lingo). Even so, after the talk a representative of Mouton's walked up to me and asked if I could be persuaded to do a collection of articles on subjects related to pragmatics. To which, of course, I said Yes, and it was this collection which finally appeared under the 'pragmalinguistic' label (Mey 1979 ), a term that had become popular for a while in Germany, but had already fallen into oblivion again by the end of the decade (see Maas l9T3andespeciallyHager,HaberlandandParis 1973; bytheway,if oneisinto dates, we have yet another memorable twentieth anniversary here).
By and bye, people decided that it would be appropriate to start talking about 'pragmatics' also on the English-speaking linguistic scene, as it had happened earlier in Denmark, in 197011977, where the pragmatic tide was in, riding on top of the antiauthoritarian crest surging up from Western Germany. Here, the "dominant doctrine" (Maas 1973b ) of Chomskyanism was being dethroned and replaced by a 'societallyrelevant' linguistics, often understood in terms of the 1968 student revolts and of the political commitment that many academics were trying to make in those years.
Browsing through the writings on pragmatics from that early period, one often stops up and wonders. A tormal definition of pragmatics, if given at all, usually defers summarily to Charles Morris' famous tripartition (1938) : syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. When it comes to a content-oriented description of the new trend, one notices that many linguists who consider themselves pragmaticists, rely mostly on Searle's theory of speech acts, which had just seen the light of day (thus Wunderlich in his famous 'Mannheim Notes', printed 1972, but to be dated much earlier, probably into the late sixties; cf. also Wunderlich's (1970) often quoted essay 'On the role of pragmatics in linguistics', published in a journal for teachers of German, but copied and off-printed, nationally and internationally, more than any single piece of pragmatic literatr.rre in those days). Others again, mainly from the Anglo-American linguistic comp, took their point of departure in Grice's famous (mostly not-or half-published) lectures, in which he set forth the principles and maxims that became his claim to fame: the Cooperative Principle and the Maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relevance, and Manner (Grice I975, 1978 Verschueren 1994) . These researchers stress the importance of the concept of 'context' in all pragmatic thinking, and how this context shouldn't be considered static, but rather, be seen as a dynamic and continually developing'activity systems' (Goodwin & Goodwin 1992: 149tf; more on this below). Interestingly, the name of Grice does not occur in all of the volume from which the previous quotation is taken: none of the authors in Duranti & Goodwin's important collection Rethinking context (1992) even mentions Grice: neither his principle or his maxims occur in the Index of the book. For others, the points were set in different ways, one of them being the wellknown one of socio-linguistics (often still spelled with a hyphen); such a choice was berated by people like Wunderlich, who declared that "sociolinguistics is unable to explain anything at all" (Maas & Wunderlich 1972: 281) ; for others again, pragmatics seerned to have become the all-encompassing umbrella uniting socio-and a ' In contrast, the tradition inspired by Grice, and later called the 'Northern Californian' one -which is a bit unfair. to around people like John Gumperz.
by Searle and their followers, is often say the least, to the 'Berkeley school' psycholinguistics. as well as the sociology and psychology of language (thus Wille & Harms Larsen l97A:6lff; cf. also the cautious plus sign in the title of the groundbreaking work of Hager, Haberland & Paris ( 1973) : Soziologie + Lingvistik; one should recall that the latter three were students of Wunderlich's, who were not going to have any trouble with their master and mentor).
Common to all these trends is the desire to declare pragmatics an autonomous zone within (sometimes outside) of linguistics: this autonomy needs to be established especially in relation to the closest competitc-rr, semantics. (More than a decade later, Geoffrey Leech is still battling with the same problematic in his Pinciples of Prugmatics, where he tries to divide the waters between semantics and pragmatics without shortchanging the one or the other, or throwing out some hidden babies; 1983: 6).
Interesting, too, is the fact that the development of the Morrisian tradition in more philosophically-oriented approaches (Carnap, Lrwis, Montague) almost entirely escaped the attention of the linguists trying to establish pragmatics as a decent member of the linguistics club. Especially Carnap is very clear in his statements about the placement of pragmatics, and uses words that deserve to be quoted even today, and perhaps with more right than the rather bland and programmatic, endlessly quoted passages from Morris (i938) . Here is Carnap, writing more than 50years ago, in 7942:
"Linguistics, in thc widest sense, is that branch of science which contains all empirical invcstigation conccrning languages. It is thc dcscriptivc, empirical part of scmiotic (of spoken or writtcn languages); hence it consists of pragmatics, scmantic.s, and descriptive syntax. But thesc three parts are not on the same level; ltragntatics is the basrs for all of lingtistrcs... scmantics and syntax arc, strictly speaking, parts of pragmatics. " (1942: 13) Carnap's approach to pragmatics continued to fascinate the philosophers, but did not appeal to too many of their linguistic or behavioral science coevals. This is all the more astonishing because Carnap, in his view of pragmatics, does not exclude any of the traditional human disciplines that have to do with human behavior; he mentions in particular "the analysis of the relations between speaking behavior and other behavior; ... ethnological and sociological studies of the speaking habits and their ditferences in dittbrent tribes, different age groups, social strata; ..." (ibid.) -all subjects that earlier would have been classified as sociolinguistic or ethnolinguistic, but which today are considered as truly pragmatic in nature.
The only direct historical continuation of that early use of the term 'pragmatic' with relation to studies of human (nowadays we would say'user') behavior is tound in the work by Watzlawick et al. (1967) ; in their pioneering study, these authors did the groundwork tor a branch of pragmatic research that would only come tcl fruition decades later, in work (e.g. by Lacoste (1981) or Frank & Treichel (1989) ) on language use by real people, here in a particular type of situation: the medical or psychiatric interview. But the studies of Watzlawick and his colleagues remained mainly unobserved by most of the linguistic community. even by those who called themselves pragmaticists in the seventies.
Another early topic, identitiable as early as the beginning of the seventies, is the setting aside of pragmatics frrlrn the rest of linguistics as something which is not 'exact',
IT not 'formalizable', and perhaps should not be formalized at all. This methodological 'iron curtain' -which, incidentally, goes back to the general aversion among pragmaticians to the formalizing apparatuses imposed by the Chomskyites on the study of language -and which now fiust like that other Iron Curtain) is a historical curiosum, remains remarkable, if not for other reasons, then because the present writer, in a joint 'Editorial' to the first issue of the Joumal of hagmarics, explicitly distanced himself from such formalizing attempts (Haberland & Mey 7977:6) .
In those days, formalism was thought of as the enemy of societally relevant research; the implication being that formalism and formal procedures were nothing but a way of idly spending one's intellectual capacities on all sorts of inconsequential trifles. Curiously enough (and fittingly, one could say), the quasi-official public resurrection of 'Formal Pragmatics' happened in 1993 at the very Conference where my original plenary talk was delivered, in a panel discussion convened by, among others, two of the same authors who in 7977 queried the use of formal approaches, and -though they did not explicitly exclude them from their Jounnl -at least showed a profound skepsis towards them, as witnessed by their eminently diplomatic (not to say pragmatic) remark: "We'll see" (Haberland & Mey 1977: 5) . Even more curious is the fact that one of the first articles on formal pragmatics was written as early as 1973 by a person, Werner Kummer, who a year before had published a full-sized book in which he defended a Marxian-based theory of texts (Kummer 1975 (Kummer , 1976 . Clearly, in those very early days, the waters were not as neatly divided as they became later; one could perhaps say that a little more murkiness would have been to the advantage of some who, being forced to come out of the closet, had to show their 'true' colors as either formal playboys or as serious, society-oriented linguists and pragmaticists -with the benefit of hindsight, surely a ridiculous distinction, if ever there was any. Here, it behooves us to remember (borrowing and adapting the words of a great linguist, in a book that became widely read and famous before ever breaking into print 20 years later): 'There is always a formal turtle under the pragmatic hedge'o (Ross 1964) Among the more hotly debated topics of early pragmatics was the question of restrictions on co-occurrence" The generative framework allowed only for very specific rules that determined what could be combined with what, if grammaticality was to be conservecl. In an early article, George Lakoff (I97I) was one of the first to question the wisdom of such restrictions, and the validity of imposing them across the board. He pointed out that the rule according to which a non-human or inanimate referent should not co-occur with the 'human' pronouns lrclshelwho, was liable to be broken in many property of every first course in linguistics, need only to be mentioned to draw forth a smile of recognition:
'Hello, this is Chuck Fillmore. Could you send over a box yea big?' (see, e.9., Fillmore I976:90; there is a fbotnote reference to an earlier paper, originally delivered at the 1971 Georgetown Round Table; Fillmore 1972) . The point of this and many other. similar examples is to identify a referent under syntactically cloudy ('opaque'). but pragmatically quite clear ('transparent') conditions. The same holds for Lauri Karttunen's and Barbara Partee's so-called 'l:rzy proncluns'; let me just quote the famclus man who gave his paycheck to his mistress, and was said to be more stupid than the one who gave it to his wife (Partee 1972) . (As one sees, ours are not the only times when a real linguist is one who is able to construct a societally relevant example)" AIso about the same time, a number of people in the linguistic camp. fbllowing the philosophers, started to worry about presuppositions (and some haven't stopped worrying ever since). The worries here were initially of the more philosophical, truthconditionally oriented kind: under what conditions can a sentence stay true even if some of its implicit ('presupposed') content becomes negated? And then there were the conditions for speech acts and their validity, where one couldn't always (or too well) speak of 'truth' -one of the first great insights (due mainly to Austin and Searle) which helped to break the stranglehold that the syntacticians, and above all the semanticists, traditionally had had on the linguists. Truth conditions were replaced by felicity conditions, but still within the environment of the single speaker and his/her utterance Questions of 'contextualization' had to wait another decade or so (more on this in Section 2, below). All these topics, many of which have become classics in the linguistic-pragmatic repertoire, bear witness to the incredible barriers that had to be overcome for a phenomenon to be recognized as transcending the (syntactic or semantic) domains where it originally had been discovered. Less charitably, some talked about such 'transcendental'phenomena as having the'wastebasket' as their proper destination (one of the first to do so was Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, in a very early paper, 191I)" A wastebasket is a place you put things that you want to get rid of, or don't know what to do with: hence a category was established for phenomena thar wouldn't iet themselves be neatly described with the utensils that were available in classical syntax and semantics.
One could say that the first characteristic of pragmatics thus was a negative one: pragmatics was alien to the 'regular' linguistic categories and domains. In order to be respectable, a pragmatic discovery had to be placed within the well-known confines of the linguistic territory, and exhibit a property that was recognized as legally classifying the phenomenon in question as either belonging to syntax or semantics. This 'reductionist' tendencv kept things in their places, and linguists happy; the wastebasket is thus an expression for the typical linguist's lnnor vacui, a reluctance to leave things out ln the open, undefined spaces of reality. By contrast, the pragmaticists themselves started out by insisting, positively, that some things not only did not fit into, but had to stay outside of, the recognized categorizatrons in clrder to be 'saved as phenomena' (tu paraphrase a classical expression;.e Otien, it took a non-linguist to say these things, and insist on them in the proper fashion, much against many linguists'will.
The case that first comes to mind as an early instance of this 'interference' by non-linguists in linguistic matters is, of course, the discovery and propagation of the phenomenon called 'speech acts' by philosophers such as Austin and Searle, and the subsequent incorporation of their discoveries into classical linguistic thinking. But notice that it took years before the initial semantic cast in which speech act theory was clad, finally could be dismantled (speech acts as a case of 'encodingism', to use Bickhard & Campbell's terminology: 1992) . not to speak of the traditionalists' endeavors to reduce speech acts and other phenomena to particular cases of certain syntactic or semantic properties of the language, e.g. by assuming some kind of 'performative' deep (or at least 'deeper') structure, as in the early versions of the so-called 'performativity hypothesis', originally (and specifically) devised to explain away some of the problems raised in the wake of the burgeclning theory of speech acts. (For a discussion of this hypothesis. see Mey 1993: 118, 148 ).
Trends
For all the topics mentioned in the previous section, a common metaphorical denominator could be that of a 'disruption', respectively an 'eruption', to be controlled, respectively contained, by and within the given framework. The case of speech act theory is a clear example of this double tendency. While speech acts, on the one hand, threaten to disrupt the framework of syntactic theory by not always or necessarily respecting the 'grammaticality'criterion (i.e., being expressed in grammatically correct sentences), and thus have to be controlled (preferably by rule-like statements), at the same time they transcend the boundaries of syntax and semantics: they are eruptions that have to be pushed down below the surface, preferably with the help of 'constraints', that is, conditions controlling output (on rules vs. constraints, see M.y lee1).
A first approximation of this trend is already visible in syntax in the late sixties in the form of what George Lakotf called 'global rules' -in reality a further development of Chomsky's earlier (1965) concept of 'selectional restrictions': whereas the former were put in the form of rules and conditions on rules, the latter were formed as conditions that operated on the output of several rules at one and the same time.
In the same sense, one could say that the 'sincerity conditions' and 'felicity conditions' on speech acts, developed by Austin and perfected and systematized by Searle under the watchful eye of Grice, are diff'erent animals: the former are derived from a rule, the sincerity rule (Searle 1969:63) , the second are really conditions on output, constraints on 'where to put your act', or 'where to do things with words', as
Ross pointed out in an early (1975) article. Ross'conclusion is typical for the trends of the times: while seeing clearly that it is impossible to separate syntax and semantics trom pragmatics ("it is not possible to relegate s1'ntactic and pragmatic processes to ditferent components of the grammar"; 1975:252), his solution is to create yet another 'component', a 'pragmantax', in which all of the three can live happily together ever after. In clther words, if one cannot put pragmatics into syntax or semantics, the next best thing is to put everything into everything ("without abandoning the distinction between pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic aspects of linguistic structure", as Ross wishfully remarks a t'ew sentences further down). The real problem here is perhaps not the trend to have constraints rather than rules as one's explanatory mechanism, but the fact that one simply cannot operate pragmatically within a strictly grammatical framework. The reason for this is not to be sought in a more or less theoretical problematic: whether or not the grammar has certatn parts ('components'), or whether or not those parts should be kept separate or allowed to cctalesce, but in the fact that human use ilf language is characterized not by isolated messages with separate structures and meanings, but by greater units of context overarching the individual utterance and assigning it its proper value, also in terms of the classical grammaticai distinctions.
As one of the 'Great Danes', Louis Hjelmslev, put it a long time (actually more than 50 years) ago, the unit of linguistic research is not the sentence or the word or the morpheme, but the text "in its undivided and absolute integrity" (Hjelmslev 1943: 73; Engl. transl. 1954:7) . What we are dealing with here, is a trend away from individual meanings and interpretations, and toward an understanding of the utterance and its parts in relation to a greater whole; however, this whole cannot be detined unrquely in 'immanent' terms, as Hjelmslev and the structuraiists thought. The term discourse that has crept into the linguistic terminology in recent years, tries to capture this trend by pointing out that the meaning of a sentence cannot be formally deduced from its syntactic and semantic components: there is always a partner to any utterance, and any utterance is in essence part of a greater dialogue, a 'discourse'.10
This insight came to linguistics as part of what is often called 'the pragmatic turn', defined not so much in terms of the topics that I talked abclut earlier as disruptions (or eruptions) of (or on) the linguistic surface, as in terms of trends that came in trom the heat, so to speak, or at any rate from without linguistics. Among those incoming outsiders, two proved to be especially successful in gaining a foothold; they were, first of all, conversation analysis (CA), and second, studies of what we were wont to call in the seventies: 'the societally reievant aspects of linguistics'" While CA originated within ethnomethodology, it soon captured the linguists', 10'Dn.(rrrse'is takcn hcre in the tradition established by Michel Foucault (see, e.g., 1972 ).
Duranti & Goodwin rcmark, much to the point, that "Discourse, hcrc, should not be confused with its usage in other analytical traditions in which it means simply the flow of conversation, or a text longer than a sentence. Rather, for Foucault, a discoursc is a cultural complcx of signs and practices that regulates how we live socially." (1992: 30).
particularly the pragmaticists', interest (witneSS, €.9.r the amount of space and coverage it is given in one of the standard reference works on pragmatics, Lrvinson's 1983 classic of that name, where almost one-tourth of the book is devoted to CA). Conversation analysts were among the first to establish the principle that whatever is said, is said in a cotilext where it must have a meaning, independent of all sorts of grammatical considerations. In a way, the conversation analysts stick to Hjelmslev's tenet about the text as the "absolute and undivided" unit of linguistic analysis; but they don't buy into his demand tor 'immanence', understood as the requirement that the meaning of an utterance be arrived at by a deductive process. Instead, they maintain that e.g. in a question-answer situation, whatever is given as the answer, ls the answer; what the analyst should worry about is how this answer came to be given in the actual surroundings, which 'traffic rules' were valid, observed, and/or broken. Recalling our earlier distinction between rules and constraints, one could say that in CA, rules and constraints flow together: what is a rule for one speaker, becomes the next speaker's constraint, and so on, recursively. One speaker's utterance sets the scene and marks the turn for the next speaker in a continuous process, the result of which is not clear until one of the parties calls an end to the interchange.
What many conversation analysts did not worry about, at least not initially or explicitly (and this is where the other 'outsider' is coming in) are the background elements of any conversation: CA deals only with visible (or audible) partners, with visible (or mostly audible) 'contextualization cues' (to use Gumperz' term; . By contrast, pragmaticists have long been aware that users of language, in their linguistic dealings, are faced with a hidden partner: society. If one can be permitted to call CA the 'overt' dark horse of linguistics, society is its 'covert' match, an even darker horse to boot. Society is the silent, but never sleeping, partner of all conversation; society determines what we can say and how we say it, and in what kind of situation or context.
It is in this connection that the important notion of 'contextualization'was first developed. Earlier, linguists had distinguished between what they called the (immediate) 'co-text' of an utterance, and its (broader) 'context'. However, it was still understood that this context based itself primarily on what was 'known', or 'the case', and on the ways interactants were able to use inferencing processes to get at those 'tacts': that which was called 'mutual' or 'background knowledge'. Gumperz, on the other hand, made it clear that such a concept was far too static: context is a dynamic notion, and not only that: the context is built up, 'constructed', by the interactants in their activity of interaction: 'hors de I'interaction, point de contexte', one could paraphrase a well-known theological apophthegm. Here is Gumperz himself:
"Although such background assumptions build on extralinguistic 'knowledge of this world', in any onc conversation this knowledge is reinterpreted as part of theprocess of conversingso that it is interactively, thus ultimately socially, constructed" (1992:230; my cmphasis).
Others (such as Duranti) go even further: for them, the language used in a social context does not only reflecl the world, it actively creates it, to the extent that the interlocutors agree on their respective placings in that world and accept the 'coercing' force of language persuading them to take their proper stances, "an emergent pragmatrc tbrce that constrains human behavior and makes recipients do what they night not otherwise do. " (1992: 80) . In other words, this use of language is not Jusr tnteractive, but 'retlexive', as Duranti & Goodwin call it in the introduction to thelr recent reader (1992: 7).
One of the first in Europe to become aware of the importance of social factors in situations of language use (such as the classroom, official encounters, public speaking, etc.) was, again, not a linguist. but a teacher (an educationalist, if one prefers): Basil Bernstein (see, e.g.,1971 Bernstein (see, e.g., -1975 Bernstein (see, e.g., ,1990 ). And even though his theories have met with much well-tbunded criticism, Bernstein's basic insights are pretty uncontroversial: the societal context has a decisive influence on the way we use, and are able to use' our linguistic inheritance: some of us are simply better at using language, be cause we have been better endowed otherwise (in all senses of the word).
The trend towards a societally relevant linguistics became embodied in pragmatics as early as the late sixties, especially in Western Europe. Much of this trend was inf-luenced by the rise of neo-Marxian doctrine, and much of it stayed captive ln an unfruitfullv exploited theoretical tramework which later collapsed under lts own weight. Yet, a number of fertile approaches and hypotheses were generated within thrs framework, some of which have survived one way or another. in different guises and shapes, even though they no longer can be called explicitly Marxian.
A central notion in this respect is that of power: Who has the right to define a linguistic situation, and what power gives him or her the right to do so? Being conscious of the existence of a (perhaps invisible, but no less real) societal power in situations where one would not even begin to dream of such a possibility, can contribute to 'liberating' the users from their invisible, but very etfective 'linguistic chains', to use an expression due to the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard. In this respect, pragmatics has been instrumental in discovering and unveiling those hidden power structures: as instances, cf. the work by people like Bourdieu, Fairclough. and the whole tradrtion of what used to be optimistically called 'emancipatory linguistics' in the seventies.
Perspectives
Linguists have seen it as one of their most important tasks to assist in, and to further, the conservation of the human cultural heritage called language. To this end, they have deployed immense resources of time and personal effort, and elicited (often successfullv) uncounted (although, of course, never sufficient) contributions from various interested and r-tot-so-interested agencies, such as the various national research funding institutions. local enterprises, and even their own and others' private pockets.
The philosophy behind this policy of conservation has been that language reflects one of the most interesting and encompassing manifestations of the human mind, and as such deserves to be respected, treated well, and kept alive, even against great odds. The ongoing debates on 'endangered languages' (e.g. at the XVth International Congress of Linguists in Qu6bec, 7992, and the discussions in recent issues of the .lncob L. Met' journal Lartgttage) have been symptomatic in this respect (See Hale et al" 1992; Ladefoged 1993 Dorian 1993 .
The emphasis here has been on keeping what (still) is there, and delivering it to the next generzrtion; cortsen,ation is the name of the game. To do the conservationist 1ob properly. however! one has to be sure that one does not propagate an erroneous pictr.rre of reality; hence a great concern with the factual, descriptive aspects of the languages that are focused on, as well as (albeit to a lesser degree) with the classificatory aspects. both genetic and typological, such as have been in the focus of much linguistic thinking, both in earher periods and recently.
In prugmatics, thc need to distinguish itself from exclusively descriptive approaches hus been accompanied by an emphasis on taking the 'describee' into ilccount as ?ln essential part of the object (language) that one wanted to describe. The social and cultural cotiexts of languages. as well as the conditions these contexts impose on their users. have been of paramount interest for pragmaticists, as we have seen in the previous scctitln. All these activities, however. can be said to be basically retroactive,in that they attempt tu reproduce a state of attairs. or bring a more primitive state of affairs up to date. An exzrmple of the latter is the emphasis on alphabetization, as embodied in the literacy campai_uns that have been waged in recent decades both at the home front and in the bush. The purpose of such campaigns was to give the 'natives', whether they were residents of the inner city or of the Gran Chaco, a chance to come up to par, and participirte in modern lit'e on an equal footing with the rest of humanity. What happened with them after that was not our concern. Once they had 'grown up', lin_quistically. they were supposed to manage their own lives. The retroactive policies that were defined in this way had a necessarily static chnrzrcter. Moreover. they were usually determined with the needs of the campaigners (the linguists. subsidiarily, the teachers, the colonizers, or the evangelists) in mind. The needs of the dontirtated population at large, of the 'language carriers', were flltered through the dominarul needs of the peclple who were in charge, the gatekeepers of the ianguttge game. Thc people. rather than playing the game as subjects, were considered to be objects. pawns that could be moved across the board whenever the real players cleemed such a move neccssary or useful. At the same tirne that being 'native speakers' of an endangered language gave Inanv clf these dorninated peoples a certain status and authurity (that of 'being always right', as we used to say). their real status remained that of a subordinate group; and (apart from un occasiclnal 'Thank You' in the preface of a doctoral dissertation) they didn't get much in return for their erssistance from the visiting linguist or anthropologist. The bartering was not on ii scale of mutual parity; there was no real interactiort. The inte raction that did take place, moreover, was often, if not always. prefaced by the thought on the purt of the dominating visitors:
'How can I use this for my projec:t. proposal, article, talk, firm, religion, etc.?' Real interaction, that is, interaction on equal terms, with actual needs and wants placed on the bargaining table, was impossible, Also because in addition, neither party mastered the other's language and culture well enough to engage in a discourse of parity. A truly interactive mode of language descripticln, maintenance. and cultivation was therefore the exceptlon, not the rule. And even in cases where there was a real will on the part of the linguist to interact on equal terms with the 'natives', he or she found him-/herself often in the impossible position of being defined, not by the interactants, but by the interaction itself and its linguistic ways of expression. The Belgizrn ethnographer-linguist Rik Pinxten tells a moving story of how he initially came to be defined as the 'enemy', only later to be called a "medecine [sic] man" among the Navajos, as a token of respect: but even so, every etfort at discussing 'privileged knowledge' (such as that regarding the Navalo world view) with members of the tribe was barred by the fact of his being an outsider. who could not partake of intormation belonging to the tribe and its elders. Only after one of their'very wise old men', Curly Mustache, had died, Pinxten and his wife were given access to intormation which earlier had formed part of the old man's stock of knowledge. (1991: 136) .
From another point of view, this lack of interaction is als<l one of the mnin elements in the concerns of otherwise well-meaning scientists and adrninistrators (bclth native and non-native) who advocate a policy of 'leavrng the people alone'. This attitude goes back all the way to the Romantic period; for instance, the well-known Dutch 19th century novelist Multatuli adopted this stance in his famous novel Mu.r Hut,elaar, or: Tlrc u1ffee auctiotts of the Dtttch Trading Company (whrch was later made rnto a very successful movie). In certain cases, the colonizer would go as far in this 'leaving alone' as to become one of the colonized ('going native', as it used to be called),'h.rs disappearing as a toreign element by adopting a quasi-native (but not nece:;arily dorninated) status. Cases in point are the Jesuit Fr. Ricci in 17th century China, or the French painter Gauguin on Tahiti in the 19th century, as well as numerous dedicated missionaries, doctors, and other development workers in our times. While such a negative colonialization policy (or lack of policy) fits in well in with the general tendency of our times tcl withdraw from colonial and oppressive positions, it has also its drawbacks. First of all, as Nancy Dorian has remarked (in connection with the Lartgttage debates on endangered languages; Dorian 1993), "one's fieldwork, however antiseptic it may try to be, inevitably has political overtones" (1993:575). In particular, she points out (arguing against Ladefoged 1992), that "linguistic salvage work ... is inevitably a political act, just as any other act touching that language would be" (ibid.: 574). The implication is that the linguist who decides to 'leave language alone' in the *rse of the native peoples (as Ladefoged seems to advocate; cf.: "That choice [either to preserve or not to preserve their language] and any other r:hoices that the Toda [a Central Indian tribe of Dravidian stock] might make, are clearly therr prerogative"; 7992:810) is lust as political as the linguist who decides that something has to be drlne to preserve an endangered language. The linguist "cannot enter the threatened-language equation without becoming a factor in it", says Dorian (1993: 578) . On the clther hand. decolonialization has not always resulted in better conditions of lit.e tbr the former colonized" The colonial powers, pulling out of their lost territories, often lefl them in a shambles: there just was nothing more for thern to do, in every possible sense of the word. By contrast. the linguists pulling out of the responsibilities that formation and experience, implicitly or explicitly, have placed upon their shoulders, cannot defend themselves by stating that "it is paternalistic of linguists to assume that they know what is best for the community" (Ladefoged 1992:810) . The linguist may not krtow: but he/she usually possesses some inforrnation that could be useful if it were shared with the speakers of the endangered language (thus, Dorian mentions the tact that tlrst generation speakers who decide to abandon their language in favor of a dominant idiom, risk to be told by their grandchildren that they were wrong not to preserve their linguistic heritage;1993:576-577). Clearly, some implications of language loss can be seen better at a distance by'neutral' observers who have no practical axes to whet.
Yet, if we turn the perspective around, it remains true that linguists and fieldworkers have not formulated any proactive policy with regard to native, possibly endangered languages. First of all, the immediate aim has been to give the people a way to write and read their language, to make them'literate', otlen with the underlying aim of familiarizing them with Western moral, religious, and political values and systems: to allow them to 'join the twentieth century', ES it is often called. Second, linguists have not asked themselves the question what to tell these people to do with their language, once they are able to write it: provide more and better examples to the linguists, or take over the linguists' job, and 'salvaging' their own language? (Not that this problem is restricted to the underdeveloped and developing countries; one could equally well ask if the purpose of making our own people literate is to enable them to read the tabloid press and comic strips). It stands to reason that no linguist (alone or as a g{oup),is able to change the political and economic conditions of the people he or she is working with. In particular, as the Danish linguist Rischel perceptively has remarked ( 1986), if damage has been done to the survival conditions of the local people, and thus also to their language's chances of surviving, the odds are that such damage may already have been done before the linguist arrived on the scene, by forces that are out of the linguists' (and the native speakers') control. Hence, we need to ask the question of conservation in a more pertinent, proactive fashion, one that could guide pragmaticians into new areas of study. It is commonly agreed that one of the areas in which linguistics has 'come of age; in pragmatics is the shift of interest in language as such as contrasted to language as used. The idea of the Native Speaker (that I commented on above), who is always right, and therefore never found, except in Chomsky's works (e.g. 1965) , is replaced by the language user, who is almost always wrong,judged by the standards of prescriptive grammar, but who manages to get a message across, who is able to communicate. The Native Speaker idolatry goes basically back to the romantic notion of the noble, unspoilt native, whose very nature was good and whose language only needed to be written down to become the object of the greatest -indeed the only legitimateinterest tor the linguist. Traces of this can be found in the terminology used by linguists, also in connections where the Native Speaker does not explicitly enter the linguistic scene. Cf. the following passage from Britto (1991: 66-67 Apart from the fact that it is patently false that 'illiterate' societies should not be able to 'manipulate' language for artistic purposes (think of Homer!), underlying this whole passage is a notion of 'naturalness' which is alien to the real language that the pragmaticist studies. Aller all, what is'natural language'? (I am not concerned with the thing that computer people call 'natural language' -that's another story, and their. headache). Natural language, like Winnicott's little child, does not exist -at least not in the sense eulogized by Britto in the passage quoted; neither does 'conversation', considered by many of its protagonists as the "prototypical kind of language use", the 'natural dialogue' in which all acquisition (and use) of language is embedded as in a 'matrix '(cf. Levinson 1983: 284) .
Parallel with the romantic notion of 'authenticity', another popular notion (also already mentioned) deserves to be debunked in the name of pragmatics: that of languages as 'endangered species'. The kind of linguistic botanism that exclusively focuses on the disappearance of a linguistic variety, without asking who were the keepers of that variety, who were the language's speakers, and under what conditions their languages disappeared and how they became 'endangered' in the first place, has nothing to do with a realistic, proactive view on language as used by real humans, not by abstract Native Speakers, as we have seen above. Similarly, a proactive approach to literary would envisage potential future uses of the written word, and take measures and precautions to ensure that it would be used in the best possible way. But not only that: a proactive approach will focus on recent advances in the areas of discourse analysis and literary pragmatics, with emphasis on the 'role of the reader', to quote a famous title by Umberto E,co (1979) : the user of language, in this case the reader, is supposed to be a major, active element in the creation of the text. Texts are not packages delivered neatly at the consumer's doorstep, like milk used to be in the good old days; the package that is delivered is in reality a benevolent kind of time bomb, Bolinger's'loaded weapon', destined to be set off or fired by the reader at the moment of opening the book, or by the spectator at curtain time.
Similarly, a proactive approach to communication would ask what kind of knowledge and information would be important to future generations, and how we should go about communicating it to them. Rather than give our successors a neatly wrapped up, but mainly passive, legacy of our culture (in the spirit and image of our would-be communication with extraterrestrial beings; cf. the notorious 'Voyager tablets'), we should endeavor to guide them on and help them avoid our mistakes, rather than tell them what to do with their own lives,languages, and cultures. Finally, a proactive approach to problems of context (in the widest sense of the term: not just the immediate co-text of a message) would not merely establish contextual conditions for a particular use of language, but look further into the problems of contexts, and of contextualization in general: what conditions are favorable to what kind of language use. and what contexts would we like to promote in this connection in the name of such time-honored concepts as 'evolution', 'progress', 'development', or even the now increasingly popular notion of an 'ecology of language'? In thrs connection, the role of the linguist, especially the linguist as tieldworker, becomes once again crucial: the contextual conditions for his or her work have to be scrutinized critically and defined in a larger setting than a simple registration of perishable material. Just as there is no true 'Native Speaker' (see Mey 1981) , there is no really 'true and blue' linguist. Every linguist represents some political power and some political stance: what we can do to encourage the development of an ecological approach to language studies and field work is to ensure that the conditions locally are such that we do not have to interfere as much with the language as we traditionally have been forced to, in the best interest of the languages and their speakers. An ideal situation would of course be one where the speakers of the language were empowered, or empowered themselves, to deal with the linguistic issues that they are contronted with in their daily and professional lives; but we must realize that in order for them to do that properly, it will be necessary for us to interfere at some point, minimally to share experiences and give advice, maximally to engage actively on the side of the threatened populations without thinking too much about our role as "responsible linguists with professional detachment" (Ladefoged 1993: 811) .
The perspective of the study of pragmatics at the end of the 20th century is closely bound up with this notion of proactively trying to identiff some trends in the spirit of the above: a proactive evoltttion on the basis of the prevalent conditions of use and users. Clearly, in this process we are faced with a dialectic: historically, the material basis for evolution determines the possibilities of evolution itself, but on the other hand, evolution cannot be understood as a mechanical process that just happens; it is determined by the understanding that people have of their own lives, including their futures. The future may already have begun, as Robert Jungk used to say, but that is only half the truth: we have begun the future, we have cut into it, not like one slices off and gobbles up a piece of birthday cake before the party, but rather by pulling away the rug from under the party itself.
Orre could perhaps define the future mission of pragmatics as 'the transmissiorr of vital contexts for language use'. The word 'mission' is used here on purpose, since what is at stake can be compared to what religious people call a'mission': pragmaticists are missionaries for a better use of language, they prepare the way for the true linguistic message, they are 'messengers of the word' -not the lifeless word of the grammarians, but the living word, as spoken by real users. However, the word is nothing out of its environment; understanding the users' world is a necessary prerequisite for understanding their words. Every word has to be fleshed out in its proper context, so that we can 'see its glory' (and real meaning), 'while it is living amongst us'.
Take again the case of the 'endangered languages': their words cannot be saved in isolation, except in a grammatical description, for the edification of the linguists only. To save languages, one has to save their users. Words need a world; languages, like users, need a vital contexl for survival.
Such vital contexts, furthermore, are social, that is, they originate in. and are continued through, the medium of society. The emphasis on words as 'signs', carriers of meaning, or 'signifiants', tends to overlook this social aspect. For Saussure and his followers, the syntagmatic context of the signitier is purely concatenative, whereas the paradigmatic context is at most an'associative'(individually-psychological) one; neither is a truly social context. But if it is the context that carries the meanings of the words, wording itself should not be described exclusively as simple signifying, but rather, as a process of establishing and continuing a social signification, in a societal discourse. Words are carriers of social meaning; the 'signitiant' is in reality a 'sociofiant', a creator of a social context. The words, furthermore, "[do] not belong to a particular individual, but to the society which that individual belongs to", to borrow the Japanese linguist Yamaguchi's pithy expression Q994:239). Both language itself and its context are primarily societal, i.e. they belong to the people living, breathing, and working in that society. That means, not onlv that their signifying in 'sociofication', their creation of the social context, is inextricably bound up with their words and with their culture; but also, that they are the first natural 'gatekeepers' to, and authorizers of, any use of their social realities and cultural artifacts, among these their language. Such an attitude may conflict with the traditional expectations of the linguists and other cultural fieldworkers (such as sociologists, anthropologists, and so on) who have considered people primarily as sources of data, as 'informants', and not as partners in a joint effort of safeguarding the culture, or protecting 'endangered languages' from extinction, as in the cases quoted above. Fortunately, there are signs in the air that this attitude among linguists and other culture workers is changing. Linguists are becoming more and more aware of the basic problems involved in gathering intormation in native settings, in'extracting'data from their 'informants', as we used to say. A heightened awareness of the conditions under which many native people live, in close contact with their history, as it is embedded in their sacred sites and burial places, has helped linguists avoid some of the worst pitfalls of patronizing attitudes such as 'knowing what is best' for those 'primitive' people. A good example of natives regaining control over their own past and present lives and culture, including their language, is found in the institution known as CRATT (for'Cultural Resources Advisory Task Team'), operating among the North American Hopi. CRATT is a body consisting of a dozen and a half tribal cultural and religious leaders who are actively concerned with the issues of conservation and maintenance of the Hopi cultural and religious heritage. They act currently as a governing body for anthropological research work to be performed among their kin. CRATT operates under the auspices of the Hopi Culture Preservation Oftice, and is thus fully under the control of the members of the social context in which the Hopi culture and religion is embedded. Field workers in anthropology and linguistics will have to conform to the norms, and stay within the limits of the traditional culture, and perform their field work in accordance with the 'Hopi Wuy' -which in certain cases may entail a ban or a limitation on what researchers will be allowed to publish of their work on Hopi matters.
(Source: Dongoske et al. 1994 ).
Needless to say that such a situation, which contrasts sharply with the earlier state of affairs, in which the traditional anthropology or linguistics worker went into'the field' and came back with some 'data' (which he or she as a rule hadn't even paid for) may strike us as novel, and maybe even a bit annoying. The reason is that for the longest time, we have been accustomed to a situation where the representative of the dominant culture also was the de facto dominant actor in the research process, while the members of the dominated culture acted as passive providers ('donor' is too strong a word) of the incoming tleldworkers' needs.
There is no doubt that anthropologists and linguists need to be critical of their own ways, and that they should not wait until they come under fire from the native populations for massive pillage of cultural values (not to speak of the other values that often were the motives behind the'anthros'penetration into uncharted, but presumably exploitable territory). Clearly, the future of anthropology and linguistics as social sciences depends on the degree to which we can manage to become critical of ourselves: "not only natives questioning anthropologists but anthropologists seriously questioning each others' wisdom", as Bion Griffin remarked recently, ir propos the Seventh Conference on Hunting and Gathering Societies (CHAGS) in Moscow, August 1993 .
But not only do we have a problem communicating with people from other cultures, and working with them on an equal basis, there is also the question of our communication with those who come after us. Traditionally, knowledge has been passed on from generation to generation by word of mouth or by written documents. Most of the time, the continuing 'handing over' of knowledge and wisdom has prevented such information from getting lost, at least in recent times. But this 'tradition' may well not be sufficient to handle future communication problems. While we cannot say much about communication as regards our future in a broader sense, and cannot too easily predict what kinds of problems posterity will encounter in this respect (the explosive growth of communication devices and techniques over the past decades may well lure us into a pretty sanguine view on this), it is our duty at least to try and think about how we can communicate with people millennia ahead of us about the problems that already are here, and are here to stay. One linguist who has given this crux of the future some thought is Roland Posner (1990; see also Mey 1994) . He squarely puts the question on the agenda of how to relay crucial information concerning nuclear waste and its disposal to a generation of humzrns whose language we don't even know. Most radioactive material will still be dangerous tens of thousands of years trom today; but if we look at what means of communication (such as, presumably, spoken languages) were used tens of thousands of years ago, and then turn this retrojection into a projection, the result is not encouraging for any future understanding. Still, the question remains: how can we tell those that come after us what we know now, in a fashion that they will understand then, so as to know how to avoid the traps that lack of knowledge will set?
Many will say that such a venture is preposterous, even futile, since we cannot possibly predict what future generations of humankind are going to be like, let alone what they will need in the nature of informational input. Imagine us giving advice as i t A soaal pragntatics for survival 259 to how to deal with problems that will arise in upcoming millennia, when we are not even able to deal with our own! But even if one concedes this point, the matters touched upon here remain eminently pragmotic in nature: that is, in dealing with them we are not only or mainly concerned with the nature of the information as such, but first and foremost with how to get it across to future users. We will have to speak to them in a language that they will understand, in a way that will prevent their safety and well-being from being jeopardized by the lasting effects of our actions.
A pragmatic look at future communication will not just concentrate on language as an abstract system of signs, on the individual languages as collections of 'sign bearers' or'sign makers' (the original meaning of the Latin term significetts, that which later became narrowed down to Saussure's'signifiart/'), but will respect languages as the bearers of communication, of culture, of silciety, indeed even of human life itself; the pragmatics of the future will be a social pragmatics for human survival.
